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This article examines the behavior and performance of speculators and
hedgers in 15 U.S. futures markets. We ﬁnd that after controlling for mar-
ket risk factors, speculators are contrarians, but respond positively to
market sentiment. In contrast, hedgers engage in positive feedback trading
and trade against market sentiment. We also ﬁnd that trades of speculators
(hedgers) are positively (negatively) correlated with subsequent abnormal
returns; however, it does not appear that speculators possess superior fore-
casting power. Therefore, hedging pressure effects likely explain the nega-
tive relation between the performance of speculators and hedgers. The
positive feedback trading by hedgers together with their negative perform-
ance suggests that hedgers have a destabilizing impact on futures prices.
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1See data description section for more details on trader classiﬁcation in the COT data.
INTRODUCTION
How investors actually behave, what affects their trading decisions, and
how traders perform have been questions of great interest to both aca-
demics and ﬁnancial market practitioners. Answers to such questions are
central to understanding the impact of trades by different traders on
asset prices and to understanding the process of asset price formation.
Extant research has predominantly analyzed the behavior and perform-
ance of institutional investors in equity markets, in particular, mutual
funds. However, little is known about the behavior and performance of
futures traders.
This article adds to the literature by providing evidence on the
behavior and performance of major types of traders in 15 futures mar-
kets using the CFTC’s (Commodity Futures Trading Commission) COT
(Commitments of Traders) data. A unique feature of the COT dataset is
that it provides a decomposition of futures positions by categorized
traders—hedgers and speculators—on the basis of whether a reportable
position is taken primarily for hedging purposes as defined by the
CFTC.1 The primary focus of this study is on the following two issues.
First, we investigate the relation between net futures positions by type of
trader and lag returns, market sentiment, as well as information vari-
ables, to understand the determinants of trading decisions. Second, we
examine the performance of trades by type of trader for evidence of
hedging pressure effects and/or market timing ability possessed by a
trader type. A side beneﬁt of analyzing simultaneously the behavior and
performance of a trader type is that this allows for the inference of
whether a trader type has a destabilizing effect on futures prices.
Evidence of feedback trades itself does not imply market destabilization
if these trades incorporate fundamental information into prices; howev-
er, positive feedback trading together with the negative performance of a
trader type suggests that the trader type has a tendency to push prices
away from the fundamental value, and thus destabilizes the market (e.g.,
Lakonishok et al., 1992).
A large body of literature has emerged to address why trades occur
and how investors behave. A popular view holds that investors trade to
rebalance portfolios (for risk sharing or liquidity needs) and speculate on
private information (e.g., Admati & Pﬂeiderer, 1988; Hirshleifer, 1988,
1990; Kyle, 1985; Llorente et al., 2001; Spiegel & Subrahmanyam,
1992). Trades can also occur as a result of investors’ irrational, but
systematic, responses to fads or sentiment (e.g., De Long et al., 1990;
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Shiller, 1984). Importantly, different trading motives predict divergent
performance across investor types. If an investor trades for hedging rea-
sons, asset prices must decrease (increase) to attract speculators to buy
(sell) (e.g., Llorente et al., 2001; Merton, 1973, 1987). If an investor
who primarily speculates on private information buys (sells) the asset,
reflecting the positive (negative) private information about the asset’s
future payoff, the subsequent price will rise (fall) (e.g., Llorente et al.,
2001; Wang, 1994). When a trader underreacts (overreacts) to news, the
resultant asset prices exhibit momentum (reversals) (e.g., Hong & Stein,
1999; Jegadeesh & Titman, 1993; Lakonishok et al., 1992). Although
various empirical tests have been performed to study equity investor
behavior and performance, the corresponding evidence in futures mar-
kets is scant. This study attempts to fill in the gap. An analysis of the
behavior and performance of speculators and hedgers is of particular
interest because it is widely held that, to transfer nonmarketable risks,
hedgers are required to pay a signiﬁcant premium to speculators for risk
bearing services, which is usually termed the “hedging pressure effect.”
As a result, the trades of hedgers are necessarily to be negatively corre-
lated with subsequent returns, whereas the trades of speculators are in
the same direction as future market movements.
Our results indicate that, after controlling for the information vari-
ables that have been shown to be priced risk factors in futures markets,
hedgers increase (decrease) net positions if the previous month’s futures
prices rose (fell), but respond negatively to lag changes in market senti-
ment. In contrast, speculators increase (decrease) net positions if the
previous month’s prices declined (increased), and respond positively to
lag changes in sentiment. Therefore, hedgers tend to engage in positive
feedback trading, whereas speculators are contrarians. Analyses of post-
feedback trade returns reveal that trades of hedgers are negatively corre-
lated with future abnormal returns, namely, hedgers increase (decrease)
net positions when the subsequent abnormal return is negative (posi-
tive). By contrast, trades of speculators relate positively to future returns.
This negative relation between the performance of speculators and
hedgers is consistent with two hypotheses: ﬁrst, hedging pressure effects
prevail in futures markets; and second, speculators possess superior tim-
ing ability. Our further evidence indicates that the ﬁrst hypothesis most
likely explains our results.
The positive feedback trading of hedgers is not inconsistent with
rational hedging practices, for example, creating options synthetically.
Such a strategy involves taking a varying position in the futures (or the
underlying asset) so that the delta of the position remains equal to that of
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the required option. For example, a synthetic put is created dynamically
to ensure hedgers against an asset price falling below a certain level by
increasing (decreasing) short futures positions when the market has
fallen (risen). Several extant studies have also suggested that dynamic
hedging can cause positive feedback trades (e.g., Gennotte & Leland,
1990; Grossman, 1988). The inverse relation between the behavior and
performance of speculators and hedgers could have been deduced from
an adding-up constraint—a hedger’s selling order most likely coincides
with a speculator’s purchase order; however, this does not prevent us
from drawing the inference that the distinct abnormal performance of
hedgers and speculators reflects hedging pressure effects (e.g.,
Bessembinder, 1992; De Roon et al., 2000; Hirshleifer, 1988, 1990).
In ﬁnance literature, concerns that positive feedback trading has a
destabilizing impact on asset prices arise because positive feedback
traders can push prices away from fundamentals. However, positive feed-
back trading is not necessarily destabilizing if these traders drive asset
prices toward the fundamental value. That is, trades by positive feedback
traders are in the same direction of subsequent price changes (e.g.,
Lakonishok et al., 1992). Therefore, a simultaneous analysis of feedback
trading and the performance of trades enables us to make an assessment
of the impact of trades by type of trader on futures prices. Our result that
hedgers engage in positive feedback trading and are associated with neg-
ative performance suggests that hedgers have a destabilizing impact on
futures prices over an intermediate (monthly) horizon. However, the con-
trarian behavior of speculators along with their positive performance does
not appear to be consistent with the popular view of destabilizing specu-
lation in ﬁnancial markets (e.g., Hart & Kreps, 1986; Stein, 1987).
A number of recent studies have documented the behavior and per-
formance of investors in equity markets. Grinblatt et al. (1995) ﬁnd that
mutual fund managers tend to pursue momentum strategies and realize
signiﬁcant excess performance. Odean (1998) ﬁnds that investors at a
U.S. discount brokerage house are reluctant to realize losses, and pres-
ents evidence that can be interpreted as consistent with contrarian
behavior. Bange (2000) documents that individual investors increase
(decrease) equity holdings when they are bullish (bearish) based on sur-
veyed data, and find no evidence of the market-timing ability of these
investors. More recently, Grinblatt and Keloharju (2000) find that
domestic investors tend to be contrarians, whereas foreign investors pur-
sue momentum strategies in the Finnish stock market. Furthermore, for-
eign investors outperform domestic investors as a result of a different
degree of sophistication across investor types.
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2It should be noted that this interpretation may be inaccurate. Ederington and Lee (2002) study a
ﬁner dataset in the heating oil futures market and ﬁnd that while “noncommercials” represent spec-
ulators, the “commercials” group likely includes some traders with no known positions in the
cash/forward markets. Nevertheless, this interpretation has been widely used in the literature (e.g.,
Bessembinder, 1992; Chang et al., 1997; De Roon et al., 2000). It is unclear from the COT reports
whether the trading motive of nonreportable position holders is hedging or speculation, and there-
fore, we exclude these traders from our analysis.
Related studies in futures markets include Chang (1985),
Hartzmark (1987, 1991), Leuthold et al. (1994), and Wang (2001).
These studies examine whether a trader type possesses forecasting
power. Chang (1985) ﬁnds that, consistent with the theory of “normal
backwardation,” speculators earn signiﬁcant proﬁts in three agricultural
futures markets. Hartzmark (1987, 1991) shows that hedgers tend to
earn proﬁts in several futures markets; however, Leuthold et al. (1994)
show that speculators possess superior forecasting ability in the frozen
pork bellies futures market. More recently, Wang (2001) documents that
speculators outperform hedgers in six agricultural futures markets, and
ﬁnds no evidence of superior forecasting ability possessed by specula-
tors. Therefore, the superior performance of speculators is consistent
with the hedging pressure theory. However, none of the extant studies
has investigated both the abnormal performance and determinants of
trading decisions by type of trader in broad futures markets.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. We ﬁrst provide
a description of our dataset. In the following sections, trading behavior
and market-timing ability by type of trader are examined. The ﬁnal sec-
tion presents our conclusions.
DATA AND SAMPLE STATISTICS
Data on Trader Positions
This article analyzes monthly data on futures trader positions in 15
futures markets over the October 1992–March 2000 interval. The trader
position data come from the CFTC’s COT reports, and are obtained from
Pinnacle Data Corp., New York. A virtue of the dataset is that it provides
a decomposition of positions held by categorized traders on the basis of
whether a trader holds a reportable commercial or noncommercial posi-
tion as defined by the CFTC. Traders taking commercial positions to
hedge a speciﬁc risk are regarded as hedgers, and those who take non-
commercial positions for reasons other than hedging are seen as spec-
ulators.2 The positions in the COT reports represent closing positions
aggregated for all outstanding contracts, filed by futures commission
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merchants, clearing members, and foreign brokers according to a trader’s
principal activities. This trader position information has been published
in the CFTC’s weekly COT reports on Fridays since October 1992, relat-
ing to the closing positions on the preceding Tuesdays. Our sample
includes three financials (S&P 500, T-bill, T-bond), four agriculturals
(corn, soybeans, wheat, world sugar), four commodities (cocoa, coffee,
crude oil, heating oil), and four foreign currencies (British pound,
Deutsche mark, Japanese yen, Swiss franc). See the Appendix for more
detailed information on these futures contracts. The diversiﬁed nature of
the sample allows for sufﬁcient cross-sectional differences in the under-
lying assets and market characteristics.
Data on Returns, Market Sentiment,
and Information Variables
A continuous series of futures returns is created for each market. The
return is measured as the percentage change in settlement prices of the
contract with the nearest delivery date using a roll-over strategy. For
example, a position is taken in the nearest-to-maturity contract until the
delivery month in which the position switches to the second-nearest
contract. To match the COT data, we construct a monthly return series,
which is the holding-period return over a 4-week interval (Tuesday–
Tuesday).
Bessembinder and Chan (1992) show that T-bill yield, default premi-
um, and equity dividend yield are priced risk factors in futures markets. It
is of interest to examine how these priced risk factors inﬂuence traders’
trading decisions and how traders perform after controlling for risk.
Therefore, we collect data on the 3-month T-bill yield, Moody’s BAA-rated
long-term corporate bond yield, AAA-rated corporate bond yield, and S&P
500 index dividend yield over the sample period. Data on futures prices
and information variables are obtained from Datastream International.
We also collect data on market sentiment for each futures market
under study. The market sentiment is proxied by the Consensus index of
bullish market opinion, published by Consensus, Inc. Consensus Inc.
consolidates newsletters that are received for the week and compiles the
index that is published on the following Friday. The Consensus index
represents the opinions of ﬁnancial analysts about future market move-
ments, and has been published since May 1983, and is available through
Consensus Research as early as 8:00 p.m. Central Time on Tuesdays.
Data on the Consensus index are obtained from Consensus Inc., and
matched with the trader position and return series in this study.
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We focus our analysis on monthly rather than weekly data because it
is less likely for traders’ perception of risk to be changed over a short
interval. Moreover, the choice of this time interval makes our results
comparable to the previous studies on backwardation or hedging pres-
sure theories (e.g., Bessembinder, 1992; Chang, 1985).
Table I presents summary statistics for the dataset. The results indi-
cate that the average monthly return is positive for the S&P 500 index,
T-bond, coffee, crude oil, heating oil, and Japanese yen futures, and neg-
ative for the other markets; however, none is statistically different from
zero except for the S&P 500 index futures. Zero-mean returns can be con-
sistent with the absence of risk premiums in futures markets, while they
cannot rule out the possibility of the existence of risk premiums that alter-
nate signs depending on time varying risks. The mean investor sentiment
is of similar magnitude for all markets, while investor sentiment is gener-
ally less volatile in the ﬁnancial futures than in the other markets.
The last two columns of Panel A present statistics for net positions
of speculators and hedgers, respectively. Consistent with the conven-
tional assumption in futures market studies, hedgers, on average, take on
net short positions in the agricultural and commodity markets, whereas
speculators’ positions are net long. In contrast, hedgers are net long, and
speculators are net short in the ﬁnancial and currency futures markets
with the exception of the T-bill and T-bond futures. Net positions of
speculators are generally smaller in magnitude than those of hedgers
except with respect to corn futures. This implies that there are other
traders in the market to take the remaining positions. Members of this
trader type are usually termed “small traders” whose positions do not
exceed the CFTC’s reporting threshold.
The correlations between sentiment, changes in net positions by
type of trader, and returns are presented in Panel B. The results show
that changes in speculator (hedger) positions are positively (negatively)
associated with sentiment and returns, and there is a strong negative
relation between changes in net positions of speculators and hedgers.
The smallest correlation in absolute terms is present in the S&P 500
index futures (0.742), while the largest correlation is in the Deutsche
mark futures (0.962). This strong correlation has implications for
interpreting our results.
Panel C provides statistics for the information variables. The aver-
age monthly T-bill yield over the sample period is 0.394%, while the
average monthly default premium and dividend yield are 0.057% and
0.176%, respectively. The average yields for all information variables are
signiﬁcantly different from zero.
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TABLE I
Summary Statistics (1993.1–2000.3)
Returns (%) Sentiment (%) Speculator Hedger
Std. Std. Std. Std.
Mean Dev. Mean Dev. Mean Dev. Mean Dev.
Panel A: Summary Statistics for Returns, Sentiment, and Net Positions
Financial
S&P 500 1.247 3.334 47.110 14.391 16.618 9.384 17.694 16.029
(2.23)**
T-bill 0.026 0.261 46.515 17.477 0.872 2.317 3.913 3.951
(1.21)
T-bond 0.081 2.357 43.654 15.754 12.790 30.435 15.370 44.593
(0.37)
Agricultural
Corn 0.051 5.938 51.568 19.961 24.666 46.508 5.838 54.061
(0.08)
Soybeans 0.130 5.730 54.157 17.763 13.321 24.667 21.392 33.224
(0.09)
Wheat 0.289 6.146 50.866 18.118 6.233 11.052 11.979 11.826
(0.38)
World sugar 0.500 7.510 50.825 21.087 13.837 27.504 25.641 36.392
(0.64)
Commodity
Cocoa 0.322 6.601 48.540 16.670 5.414 11.224 12.761 14.244
(0.19)
Coffee 0.698 13.029 48.026 20.707 3.804 6.251 8.300 7.727
(0.54)
Crude oil 0.222 7.435 47.814 20.056 7.553 26.258 7.961 36.897
(0.51)
Heating oil 0.065 7.720 44.272 22.501 2.673 9.413 17.376 13.579
(0.32)
Foreign Currency
British pound 0.207 2.514 44.660 20.036 0.526 13.449 0.884 19.587
(0.24)
Deutsche mark 0.330 2.655 39.629 18.769 8.026 21.631 15.220 31.752
(1.03)
Japanese yen 0.126 3.688 36.917 18.715 13.148 21.926 20.795 31.960
(0.42)
Swiss franc 0.251 3.097 38.760 19.343 5.801 15.348 10.616 22.182
(0.06)
(Continued )
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TABLE I (Continued)
SI ∀ NIS SI ∀ NIH R ∀ NIS R ∀ NIH NIS ∀ NIH
Panel B: Correlations
Financial
S&P 500 0.241 0.248 0.308 0.301 0.742
T-bill 0.193 0.295 0.151 0.181 0.856
T-bond 0.205 0.191 0.331 0.319 0.880
Agricultural
Corn 0.265 0.339 0.283 0.339 0.920
Soybeans 0.416 0.471 0.564 0.628 0.878
Wheat 0.409 0.415 0.389 0.371 0.933
World sugar 0.327 0.421 0.373 0.448 0.894
Commodity
Cocoa 0.511 0.525 0.482 0.463 0.939
Coffee 0.315 0.352 0.348 0.378 0.939
Crude oil 0.140 0.180 0.348 0.366 0.944
Heating oil 0.312 0.324 0.374 0.415 0.909
Foreign Currency
British pound 0.301 0.302 0.352 0.324 0.959
Deutsche mark 0.195 0.197 0.232 0.243 0.962
Japanese yen 0.317 0.355 0.351 0.369 0.957
Swiss franc 0.270 0.299 0.324 0.343 0.925
Mean Std. Dev. T-Statistic Description
Panel C: Summary Statistics and Description for Informational Variables
BYLD 0.394 0.008 13.98*** Monthly yield on the 90-day T-bill
BAA-AAA 0.057 0.008 12.59*** Monthly yield on a low-grade corporate bond portfolio
less the yield on a high-grade bond portfolio
DYLD 0.176 0.052 8.01*** Monthly dividend yield on a stock market portfolio
Note. The return is measured as the percentage change in settlement prices of a futures contract over a 4-week interval.
Investor sentiment is proxied by the Consensus index, in percent. Net positions are deﬁned as the long positions less the
short positions of a trader type on the basis of the CFTC’s COT reports, in units of 1,000 contracts. BYLD is the monthly
yield on the 3-month Treasury bills. BAA-AAA is the monthly yield on the Moody’s BAA-rated bonds less the yield on AAA-
rated bonds. DYLD is the monthly dividend yield on the S&P 500 index. SI  NIS(H) denotes the correlation between senti-
ment index and net positions of speculators (hedgers). R  NIS(H) denotes the correlation between returns and changes in
net positions of speculators (hedgers). N IS  N IH is the correlation between changes in net positions of speculators and
hedgers. The numbers in parentheses are t-statistics relevant to the hypothesis that the relevant parameter is zero.
BUY OR SELL BEHAVIOR BY TYPE
OF TRADER
Determinants of Trading Decisions
We study the determinants of trading decisions of the two major trader
types—speculators and hedgers—by looking at how trader positions
covary with available information. Shefrin and Statman (1985),
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3In this study, a month represents a 4-week interval (Tuesday–Tuesday). This ensures that all obser-
vations are on Tuesday, matching the COT data.
4The Treasury bill yield is nonstationary, and thus, the change in Treasury bill yield is used in this study.
Nofsinger and Sias (1999), and Grinblatt and Keloharju (2000) show that
investors most likely condition their trades on past returns, exhibiting
negative/positive feedback trading behavior. Shiller (1984) and De Long
et al. (1990) posit that the influences of fad and fashion are likely to
impact traders’ investment decisions. In the finance literature, certain
common information variables, including T-bill yield, equity dividend
yield, and default premium, have been shown to have forecasting power
in futures markets (e.g., Bessembinder & Chan, 1992; Bjornson &
Carter, 1997). These information variables likely have an effect on
traders’ decisions. Therefore, in this study we are interested in how lag
investor sentiment, returns, and common information variables inﬂuence
trading decisions by type of trader.
Empirical Tests
We test the determinants of trading decisions by type of trader by esti-
mating the following equation for each market:
(1)
where represents the change in net positions of trader type i in
month t  1,3 and i denotes speculators and hedgers. A net position is
deﬁned as the long position less the short position of a trader type, in
units of 1,000 contracts. SIt denotes the change in the Consensus index
in month t. Rt is the futures return in month t, in percent. t is a set of
common information variables available to all investors in month t,
including: (i) the monthly yield on 3-month T-bills, representing the
short-term discount rate or expected inﬂation;4 (ii) the monthly yield on
Moody’s BAA-rated long-term corporate bonds less the yield on AAA-
rated corporate bonds, representing a premium of default risk; and
(iii) the monthly dividend yield on the S&P 500 index, which tends to be
higher during periods of slow economic growth or recessions (e.g., Fama
& French, 1989), and is regarded as a signal for risk premium.
Results
The results of estimating Equation (1) are reported in Table II. There are
97 monthly observations for each regression. Panel A presents the regres-
sion results for speculators. The coefﬁcient estimate for lag changes in
¢NIt1i
¢NIt1i  ai0  ai1¢SIt  ai2Rt  ©bij£jt  eit1
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TABLE II
Changes in Net Positions, and Lag Changes in Sentiment, Returns,
as Well as Information Variables
BAA- Durbin-
Intercept SIt Rt BYLDt AAAt DYLDt Watson Adj. R
2
Panel A: Speculator
Financial
S&P 500 3.233 0.023 0.359 13.63 51.613 4.098 2.12 0.031
(0.41) (0.54) (1.93)* (0.42) (0.33) (0.29)
T-bill 0.599 0.014 1.413 17.466 17.469 0.520 2.20 0.029
(0.30) (1.09) (2.14)** (0.92) (0.93) (0.19)
T-bond 29.868 0.215 1.607 84.791 526.452 3.039 2.15 0.025
(1.45) (1.16) (1.71)* (0.53) (1.76)* (0.11)
Agricultural
Corn 4.277 0.489 0.705 2.809 71.941 1.656 2.05 0.078
(0.35) (4.18)*** (2.46)** (0.03) (0.42) (0.07)
Soybeans 2.786 0.055 0.126 73.376 38.847 2.935 1.92 0.019
(0.54) (0.99) (1.17) (0.79) (0.54) (0.22)
Wheat 1.605 0.219 0.699 24.452 54.397 7.730 2.13 0.154
(0.19) (3.81)*** (4.31)*** (0.46) (0.43) (0.39)
World sugar 2.195 0.222 0.063 76.544 19.655 4.851 2.14 0.054
(0.25) (3.66)*** (0.39) (0.82) (0.13) (0.24)
Commodity
Cocoa 4.055 0.057 0.279 56.221 41.899 7.956 2.10 0.041
(0.57) (1.77)* (2.28)** (1.57) (0.42) (0.56)
Coffee 3.449 0.064 0.162 17.622 46.546 4.761 2.16 0.045
(0.56) (2.16)** (3.86)*** (0.39) (0.38) (0.34)
Crude oil 10.779 0.439 1.498 2.928 253.189 16.937 2.12 0.166
(0.64) (3.40)*** (3.99)*** (0.03) (0.95) (0.43)
Heating oil 1.809 0.189 0.556 9.898 52.488 6.605 2.09 0.149
(0.28) (4.04)*** (4.20)*** (0.24) (0.53) (0.36)
Foreign Currency
British pound 12.046 0.196 3.956 125.886 209.512 1.156 2.29 0.134
(0.84) (2.35)** (3.73)*** (1.18) (0.99) (0.08)
Deutsche mark 15.929 0.238 4.074 141.139 317.010 11.253 2.24 0.084
(0.66) (2.22)** (4.38)*** (1.14) (1.24) (0.21)
Japanese yen 9.073 0.204 1.701 191.941 87.701 24.711 2.14 0.050
(0.49) (2.24)** (3.37)*** (1.91)* (0.31) (0.53)
Swiss franc 11.285 0.202 2.465 110.319 238.945 11.878 2.13 0.081
(0.88) (2.97)*** (3.75)*** (0.86) (1.26) (0.29)
(Continued)
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TABLE II (Continued)
BAA- Durbin-
Intercept SIt Rt BYLDt AAAt DYLDt Watson Adj. R
2
Panel B: Hedger
Financial
S&P 500 1.094 0.153 0.835 34.623 46.422 0.707 2.14 0.038
(0.12) (1.96)** (1.85)* (0.49) (0.31) (0.37)
T-bill 1.553 0.016 1.592 37.456 23.04 0.473 2.05 0.041
(0.59) (1.03) (1.79)* (1.50) (0.72) (0.08)
T-bond 24.607 0.025 2.582 403.878 290.145 50.534 2.22 0.045
(0.97) (0.16) (2.48)** (2.15)** (0.67) (0.96)
Agricultural
Corn 4.775 0.246 0.929 10.655 58.422 4.601 2.14 0.101
(0.17) (2.47)** (3.07)*** (0.08) (0.33) (0.15)
Soybeans 1.837 0.059 0.149 74.540 22.038 2.819 2.19 0.013
(0.31) (0.96) (0.32) (0.80) (0.29) (0.19)
Wheat 2.418 0.267 0.945 20.383 73.864 9.733 2.13 0.175
(0.25) (4.02)*** (4.77)*** (0.31) (0.50) (0.42)
World sugar 2.261 0.280 0.211 138.088 11.354 7.416 2.15 0.036
(0.18) (3.39)*** (0.91) (1.01) (0.06) (0.28)
Commodity
Cocoa 4.788 0.057 0.380 74.058 62.903 5.861 2.23 0.042
(0.59) (1.78)* (2.62)** (1.71)* (0.54) (0.34)
Coffee 4.043 0.071 0.195 4.854 53.134 5.937 2.18 0.045
(0.63) (2.27)** (4.34)*** (0.13) (0.43) (0.41)
Crude oil 18.116 0.618 2.285 5.119 402.971 20.588 2.13 0.198
(0.76) (3.55)*** (4.65)*** (0.68) (1.09) (0.37)
Heating oil 4.914 0.195 0.781 69.503 87.731 0.803 2.19 0.109
(0.51) (3.06)*** (3.92)*** (0.98) (0.59) (0.05)
Foreign Currency
British pound 17.047 0.257 5.889 178.318 296.061 2.094 2.40 0.142
(0.85) (2.14)** (3.86)*** (1.20) (1.03) (0.05)
Deutsche mark24.001 0.351 6.138 175.85 472.832 15.103 2.26 0.099
(0.71) (2.28)** (4.91)*** (1.01) (1.32) (0.19)
Japanese yen 16.587 0.282 2.830 330.783 181.302 38.969 2.16 0.070
(0.59) (2.06)** (3.81)*** (2.12)** (0.45) (0.58)
Swiss franc 16.897 0.271 3.704 135.910 348.173 15.378 2.44 0.082
(0.83) (2.57)** (3.85)*** (0.76) (1.24) (0.27)
Note. A net position is deﬁned as the long position less the short position of a trader type on the basis of the CFTC’s
COT reports, in units of 1,000 contracts. SI is the change in the Consensus index, in percent. BYLD is the change in
monthly yield on the 3-month Treasury bills. BAA-AAA is the monthly yield on the Moody’s BAA-rated bonds less the yield
on AAA-rated bonds. DYLD is the monthly dividend yield on the S&P 500 index. Test statistics for individual coefﬁcients
reported in parentheses are t-statistics computed using White (1980) heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors. ***, **,
and * denote signiﬁcance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively.
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5For example, Bodie and Rosansky (1980) showed that substantial benefits were available to
investors by combining portfolios of commodities and stocks, because of their negative correlation
arising from opposite inﬂation sensitivities.
sentiment is positive and significant for all except the financial and
soybean futures markets (insigniﬁcant, however), whereas the coefﬁcient
for lag returns is negative and signiﬁcant. This suggests that, after con-
trolling for risk factors, speculators increase net positions when the mar-
ket has turned bullish, but decrease net positions if futures prices appre-
ciated over the previous month, and vice versa. Thus, speculators respond
positively to market sentiment and exhibit contrarian behavior. Take the
corn futures as an example: if prices appreciated by 1 percentage point
over the previous month, speculators cut back net positions by 705 con-
tracts; however, they increase net positions by 489 contracts if the
Consensus index rose by 1 percentage point.
It appears that the information variables do not signiﬁcantly inﬂu-
ence the trading decisions of speculators. The coefﬁcient estimates for
information variables are statistically significant only in two cases:
changes in T-bill yield for the Japanese yen futures and default premium
for the T-bond futures. Overall, the coefﬁcient estimates for changes in
T-bill yield and default premium are more likely to be negative than pos-
itive. This result tends to be consistent with the rationale that expected
inﬂation and default premium are associated with negative expected pre-
miums, and therefore, speculators cut back net positions (e.g.,
Bessembinder & Chan, 1992; Bjornson & Carter, 1997). The positive
coefﬁcients for changes in T-bill yield for interest rate and some physical
commodity futures suggest that these assets provide a natural hedge to
the types of risk.5 Moreover, the effect of information variables on the
trading decisions of speculators is larger in magnitude in currency
futures than in the other markets; however, dividend yield appears to
have no discernable effects on traders’ strategies in these markets.
Panel B of Table II presents the regression results for hedgers. As a
sharp contrast with the results for speculators, the coefﬁcient estimate
for lag changes in sentiment is negative and signiﬁcant (except for the
interest rate and soybean futures markets), while that for lag returns is
positive and signiﬁcant. Thus, hedgers increase (decease) net positions
when the market has turned bullish (bearish); however, they cut back net
positions if prices declined in the previous month, and vice versa. Such a
practice is called positive feedback trading, and has been extensively
studied in ﬁnance literature (e.g., De Long et al., 1990; Shiller, 1984).
For the corn futures, hedgers on average increase net positions by 929
contracts if prices appreciated by 1 percentage point over the previous
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6Lynch (2001) provides evidence on the impact of return predictability on investors’ multiperiod
equity portfolio choices. He shows that return predictability of information variables can tilt equity
investors’ portfolios away from high book-market and small-size stocks. Thus, hedging demands pro-
vide an explanation for the size and book-market effects.
7See Hull (2000, pp. 331–334) for a detailed description of this type of hedging strategy.
month; however, if the sentiment index rose by 1 percentage point, they
cut back net positions by 246 contracts.
Although signiﬁcant only in a few cases, the coefﬁcient estimates
for information variables for hedgers have opposite signs to those for
speculators. This result tends to be in line with the “hedging demand”
argument of Merton (1973). Because the available investment opportu-
nities change as the information variables vary, Merton shows that
investors may hedge these changes by investing in a way that gives them
higher wealth precisely when investment opportunities are unattractive,
i.e., when expected returns are low. Therefore, hedgers adjust their posi-
tions as a way of hedging against movements in expected returns, as con-
trasted with the behavior of speculators.6
Positive feedback trading by hedgers is not inconsistent with common
hedging practices, for example, creating options synthetically. Such a strat-
egy involves taking a varying position in the futures or the underlying asset
so that the delta of the position remains equal to that of the required
option. For example, a synthetic put that insures hedgers against the asset
value dropping below a certain level is dynamically created by taking a
short futures position, in conjunction with a bond position. Moreover, this
strategy requires hedgers to increase (decrease) short positions when the
market has fallen (risen).7 A number of extant studies have also suggested
that dynamic hedging can cause positive feedback trades (e.g., Gennotte &
Leland, 1990; Grossman, 1988; Jacobs, 1998). The inverse relation
between the behavior of speculators and hedgers could have been deduced
from an adding-up constraint—a hedger’s selling most likely coincides
with a speculator’s buying. The futures markets literature uniformly pre-
sumes that futures markets are designed to facilitate the transfer of risk to
those most able and willing to bear it. Therefore, the negative feedback
trades of speculators are likely to be induced by trades of hedgers, which
can also be seen from the fact that the magnitude of coefﬁcient estimates
for returns is larger for hedgers than for speculators, and there is a strong
negative correlation between positions taken by these two major types of
traders (see Panel B of Table I).
Robustness
There is no a priori reason to assume that investors condition their
trades solely on the previous month’s information. In futures markets,
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speculators likely adjust positions over shorter horizons in response to
short-term information, while hedgers who are concerned about funda-
mental information tend to hold positions for longer horizons. For
robustness, we repeat the analysis using the data for 2-week and 6-week
intervals. For both horizons, the estimated coefficients for changes in
sentiment and returns are generally consistent with the results reported
in Table II.
MARKET TIMING TESTS
Changes in Net Positions and Subsequent
Futures Returns
In this section, we investigate traders’ market-timing ability by examining
how changes in net positions by type of trader covary with future market
movements. We examine traders’ timing ability for two reasons. First, sim-
ilar to investor behavior studies in equity markets (e.g., Bange, 2000;
Grinblatt & Kelharju, 2000; Nofsinger & Sias, 1999), we evaluate the
average performance of various futures traders. This issue has also long
been of interest to futures market researchers (e.g., Chang, 1985;
Hartmark, 1991). Different from the methodology used in Hartmark
(1991), this study focuses on the return to positions held by a trader
rather than the return realized by the trader. After accounting for market
risk factors, evidence that a speculator increases (decreases) net positions
before the market rises (falls) is consistent with risk premiums to the
trader for bearing nonmarketable risks and/or superior forecasting ability
possessed by the trader. Second, post-feedback trade returns facilitate the
inference of whether a trader type has a destabilizing impact on prices.
For example, if hedgers engage in positive feedback trading, and changes
in hedgers’ positions relate negatively to future returns, positive feedback
trades of hedgers tend to be destabilizing (e.g., Lakonishok et al., 1992).
To test market-timing ability by type of trader, we follow a method-
ology similar to that of Graham and Harvey (1996), and estimate the
following model:
(2)
wheret is the set of information variables, which are designed to separate
market-timing ability based on public information from the market-timing
ability that is superior to public information. Thus, the coefﬁcient estimate
for changes in net positions can be interpreted as abnormal performance.
If the estimated coefficient on changes in net positions is on average
greater than zero, the trader type increases (decreases) net positions before
the abnormal return is positive (negative).
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Table III reports the results of estimating Equation (2). Panel A of
Table II shows the results for speculators. The estimated coefﬁcient on
net positions is positive for all except the cocoa and coffee futures
(insigniﬁcant for the latter market);8 however, it is insigniﬁcant except
for the T-bill, corn, world sugar, and Japanese yen futures. The coefﬁ-
cient estimates for information variables are insigniﬁcant except for the
default premium in a few markets. In sum, our ﬁndings suggest that an
increase in speculators’ net positions is more likely to be associated with
a positive subsequent return than a negative return, and vice versa.
The results reported in Panel B of Table III show that the coefﬁcient
estimate associated with changes in hedgers’ net positions is generally
negative, with the exception of the cocoa and coffee futures, although
signiﬁcant only for the wheat, Deutsche mark, and Japanese yen futures
markets. Therefore, contrary to the result for speculators, hedgers judge
incorrectly the direction of future market movements, on average.
We should be cautious when interpreting the results of market-
timing tests in futures markets. The fact that hedgers consistently get
the direction of market movements wrong likely reﬂects hedging pres-
sure effects, meaning that hedgers who transfer nonmarketable risks are
required to pay a risk premium. Evidence from several extant studies is
supportive of the existence of hedging pressure effects (e.g.,
Bessembinder, 1992; De Roon et al., 2000). Therefore, the positive
abnormal performance of speculators may suggest that speculators earn
a risk premium by assuming nonmarketable risks, and does not necessar-
ily imply that these traders are associated with superior information (see
a detailed discussion in the analysis that follows).
In conjunction with the evidence of positive feedback trading, the
negative performance of hedgers suggests that hedgers have a tendency to
move prices away from the fundamental value, and thus have a destabiliz-
ing inﬂuence on futures prices over the intermediate (monthly) horizon.
However, the hypothesis that speculation is destabilizing can be rejected
by the contrarian behavior of speculators and the associated positive
abnormal performance. This result is particularly striking, because the
popular view is that speculation destabilizes the market (e.g., Hart &
Kreps, 1986; Stein, 1987). Due to this concern, speculators in U.S.
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8There have been considerable inﬂows of money from hedge and managed futures funds into com-
modity markets (in particular, cocoa and coffee) since 1994 (e.g., Gilbert, 1994). These funds usu-
ally move into cocoa and coffee markets by taking on net long positions, on average (e.g., Mitchell &
Gilbert, 1997; see also Table I). However, cocoa and coffee prices have been weak since 1997 and
1994 respectively, with a sharp drop in cocoa price from $1,700/ton in August 1997 to $870/ton in
March 2000. This tends to provide an explanation for the negative performance of speculators in
these two markets.
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TABLE III
Changes in Net Positions by Type of Trader and Subsequent Returns
Durbin-
Intercept NIt BYLDt BAA-AAAt DYLDt Watson Adj. R
2
Panel A: Speculator
Financial
S&P 500 0.786 0.051 13.211 36.298 0.069 2.26 0.012
(0.24) (1.33) (0.53) (0.82) (0.05)
T-bill 0.216 0.024 0.853 3.265 0.329 2.11 0.023
(1.21) (1.99)** (0.41) (1.32) (0.33)
T-bond 3.443 0.013 15.305 63.667 1.259 1.84 0.043
(1.81)* (1.09) (1.07) (2.55)** (0.25)
Agricultural
Corn 1.755 0.029 24.885 5.034 11.791 1.86 0.031
(0.38) (2.12)** (0.77) (0.11) (0.99)
Soybeans 0.451 0.001 14.536 36.410 13.237 2.11 0.015
(0.08) (0.18) (0.43) (0.59) (1.12)
Wheat 1.815 0.051 7.289 11.480 11.237 2.00 0.009
(0.36) (0.76) (0.19) (0.17) (0.89)
World sugar 0.302 0.029 16.986 89.505 24.418 2.12 0.013
(0.43) (1.84)* (0.38) (1.32) (1.46)
Commodity
Cocoa 2.172 0.304 38.049 110.756 21.279 2.18 0.104
(0.44) (2.45)** (1.01) (1.81)* (1.56)
Coffee 13.027 0.254 85.877 132.339 32.281 2.01 0.019
(1.34) (1.16) (0.98) (1.01) (1.23)
Crude oil 4.858 0.001 49.230 120.718 10.216 2.07 0.005
(0.71) (0.80) (0.99) (0.99) (0.61)
Heating oil 6.133 0.015 18.318 123.486 4.463 2.07 0.011
(0.80) (0.18) (0.39) (0.93) (0.28)
Foreign Currency
British pound 2.006 0.006 2.892 34.161 0.084 2.20 0.021
(1.66)* (1.02) (0.22) (1.88)* (0.28)
Deutsche mark 2.240 0.013 7.370 32.958 4.889 2.03 0.027
(1.03) (1.34) (0.48) (2.13)** (0.89)
Japanese yen 3.022 0.040 0.131 42.069 6.179 2.02 0.048
(1.56) (2.18)** (0.32) (1.03) (0.83)
Swiss franc 2.383 0.016 4.337 63.083 6.565 2.03 0.028
(1.03) (0.87) (0.24) (2.04)** (1.19)
(Continued )
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TABLE III (Continued)
Durbin-
Intercept NIt BYLDt BAA-AAAt DYLDt Watson Adj. R
2
Panel B: Hedger
Financial
S&P 500 0.564 0.017 12.689 33.041 0.188 2.31 0.009
(0.20) (0.50) (0.53) (0.70) (0.02)
T-bill 0.226 0.017 0.865 3.458 0.339 2.11 0.010
(1.24) (1.51) (0.41) (1.34) (1.39)
T-bond 3.440 0.007 14.173 63.247 1.159 1.89 0.030
(1.78)* (0.86) (1.53) (2.52)** (0.23)
Agricultural
Corn 1.559 0.017 22.008 9.233 11.777 1.91 0.012
(0.35) (0.41) (0.68) (0.21) (1.08)
Soybeans 0.409 0.004 13.014 37.662 13.837 2.14 0.018
(0.09) (0.78) (0.43) (0.66) (1.57)
Wheat 1.552 0.049 5.521 15.625 11.222 1.98 0.007
(0.31) (1.94)* (1.03) (0.23) (0.86)
World sugar 0.453 0.029 18.968 90.399 24.426 2.17 0.016
(0.07) (1.21) (0.35) (0.72) (1.55)
Commodity
Cocoa 2.023 0.263 36.517 104.186 20.529 2.18 0.149
(0.41) (2.30)** (1.16) (1.76)* (1.44)
Coffee 13.061 0.232 83.879 133.510 32.272 2.00 0.011
(1.34) (1.13) (1.17) (1.07) (1.23)
Crude oil 4.713 0.012 46.733 117.699 10.208 2.11 0.002
(0.69) (1.06) (0.93) (0.99) (0.61)
Heating oil 6.174 0.018 19.320 124.425 4.412 2.05 0.011
(0.81) (0.28) (0.41) (0.93) (0.28)
Foreign Currency
British pound 2.007 0.006 3.802 34.186 0.077 2.20 0.012
(1.66)* (1.59) (0.33) (2.24)** (0.03)
Deutsche mark 2.262 0.015 7.176 58.364 4.871 2.01 0.031
(1.05) (1.79)* (0.46) (2.15)** (1.18)
Japanese yen 3.024 0.024 6.594 38.151 5.549 2.27 0.035
(1.52) (1.91)* (0.27) (1.24) (0.78)
Swiss franc 1.084 0.004 0.693 42.001 6.573 2.20 0.021
(0.58) (0.38) (0.05) (1.75)* (1.21)
Note. A net position is deﬁned as the long position less the short position for a trader type on the basis of the CFTC’s COT
reports, in units of 1,000 contracts. BYLD is the change in monthly yield on the 3-month Treasury bills. BAA-AAA is the
monthly yield on the Moody’s BAA-rated bonds less the yield on AAA-rated bonds. DYLD is the monthly dividend yield
on the S&P 500 index. Test statistics for individual coefficients reported in parentheses are t-statistics computed using
White (1980) heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors. ***, **, and * denote signiﬁcance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels,
respectively.
futures markets face more regulatory restrictions, and are subject to
higher transaction costs compared to hedgers.
The Level of Net Positions by Type of Trader
and Subsequent Returns
Traders may hold a substantially large position if they expect that the
futures price is trending downward or upward. To test for this possibility,
we also examine the relation between the level of net positions by type of
trader and returns in the subsequent month. The empirical model is of
the following form:
(3)
The major difference between Equation (3) and Equation (2) is
that Equation (3) uses the level of net positions, while changes in net
positions are used in Equation (2). Table IV reports the regression results
of estimating Equation (3). To conserve space, only the coefﬁcient asso-
ciated with net positions is reported. Consistent with the results in
Table III, the coefﬁcient estimate associated with net positions of specu-
lators is positive, whereas that for hedgers’ net positions is negative, with
a few exceptions, although parameter estimates are only significantly
different from zero for some agricultural and currency futures markets.
The adjusted R2s of regressions are also small. This suggests that a
trading rule conditional on net trader positions may not be reliable.
Nevertheless, broadly consistent with the previous ﬁndings, speculators
have a tendency to hold a net long rather than short position before the
market rises, whereas the opposite is true for hedgers.
Trading Rule Proﬁtability
If the relation between trader positions and subsequent returns for a trad-
er type shows a systematic pattern, investors could proﬁt from trader posi-
tion information. Our previous results indicate that hedgers likely judge
incorrectly the direction of market movements, and the reverse is true for
speculators. Therefore, we would expect that a strategy conditional on
large changes in net positions of speculators and hedgers is proﬁtable. To
test for this conjecture, we examine the proﬁtability of the following trad-
ing rule: long (short) one unit of futures and hold it for 1 month if changes
in net positions in the market are large. A large change in net positions is
Rt1  g
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TABLE IV
The Level of Net Positions by Type of Trader and Subsequent Returns
Speculator Hedger
Slope Coefﬁcient Adj. R2 Slope Coefﬁcient Adj. R2
Financial
S&P 500 0.010 0.011 0.031 0.013
(0.22) (1.01)
T-bill 0.004 0.010 0.005 0.009
(0.22) (0.63)
T-bond 0.007 0.024 0.002 0.019
(0.78) (0.33)
Agricultural
Corn 0.028 0.016 0.024 0.023
(1.78)* (1.78)*
Soybeans 0.021 0.011 0.013 0.019
(1.85)* (1.75)*
Wheat 0.047 0.024 0.034 0.021
(1.73)* (1.68)*
World sugar 0.008 0.006 0.037 0.003
(0.12) (0.19)
Commodity
Cocoa 0.125 0.062 0.105 0.065
(1.45) (1.74)*
Coffee 0.158 0.008 0.080 0.012
(0.65) (0.56)
Crude oil 0.024 0.015 0.028 0.013
(0.74) (1.13)
Heating oil 0.020 0.014 0.007 0.013
(0.32) (0.19)
Foreign Currency
British pound 0.013 0.038 0.024 0.041
(1.71)* (2.07)**
Deutsche mark 0.017 0.018 0.005 0.025
(1.73)* (0.56)
Japanese yen 0.018 0.019 0.014 0.031
(1.88)* (1.75)*
Swiss franc 0.027 0.028 0.021 0.039
(1.95)* (1.50)
Note. A net position is deﬁned as the long position less the short position of a trader type on the basis of the
CFTC’s COT reports, in units of 1,000 contracts. BYLD is the change in monthly yield on the 3-month
Treasury bills. BAA-AAA is the monthly yield on the Moody’s BAA-rated bonds less the yield on AAA-rated
bonds. DYLD is the monthly dividend yield on the S&P 500 index. Test statistics for individual coefﬁcients
reported in parentheses are t-statistics computed using White (1980) heteroskedasticity consistent standard
errors. ***, **, and * denote signiﬁcance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively.
deﬁned as one standard deviation away from the average change in net
positions for a trader type over a 3-year moving window prior to the cur-
rent month.9 We compute mean abnormal returns in the subsequent
month based on large changes in net positions. Also computed is the
mean abnormal return for a strategy of simultaneously longing a unit of
futures after a large increase in net positions and shorting a unit of futures
after a large decrease in net positions.
The abnormal return for each market is computed by adjusting
monthly raw returns for risk. Suppose that returns are generated by the
following factor model:
(4)
where t1 is the set of information variables that have been shown to be
priced risk factors in futures markets. d0 represents the zero-beta return,
which is supposed to be zero due to zero investment in futures markets.
Equation (4) is estimated for each market by (rolling) regressing time
series returns using data for 36 months (3 years) prior to the month con-
taining month t. For example, in January 1993, djt is estimated using the
data on returns and information variables over the interval from January
1990 to December 1992.10 The estimated abnormal return on each mar-
ket, rt, is calculated as
(5)
Results on the trading rule proﬁtability are reported in Table V. A
(B) denotes a trading strategy that follows a large increase (decrease) in
net positions of a trader type. AMB represents a strategy of simultane-
ously longing a unit of futures after a large increase in positions and
shorting a unit of futures after a large decrease in positions, and there-
fore, the mean return for AMB provides a comprehensive measure of
trading rule proﬁtability. Consistent with the previous results, the mean
return for AMB is positive for speculators for all but the cocoa and coffee
futures. Take the corn futures as an example: the average monthly
abnormal return for a strategy that buys after a large increase in net posi-
tions and sells after a large decrease in net positions is 2.38% (annual-
ized 28.56%). In contrast, the mean return for AMB is negative for
rt  Rt  ©dj£jt1
Rt  d0  ©dj£jt1  et
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9We compute the standard deviation over a 3-year moving window to make the trading rule tradable.
Our results are not substantially changed if a 5-year moving window is used.
10We also use a 5-year moving window for the rolling regressions. Our results remain largely unal-
tered.
22 Wang
TABLE V
Trading Rule Proﬁtability
Speculator Hedger
A B AMB A B AMB
Financial
S&P 500 0.178 0.009 0.188 0.404 0.096 0.501
(0.33) (0.03) (0.13) (0.44) (0.18) (0.36)
T-bill 0.001 0.078 0.080 0.126 0.068 0.192
(0.08) (0.54) (0.61) (1.04) (1.01) (1.45)
T-bond 0.939 0.039 0.952 0.098 0.188 0.086
(0.11) (1.77)* (1.13) (0.47) (0.18) (0.11)
Agricultural
Corn 0.916 1.465 2.380 1.085 0.856 1.933
(0.95) (1.53) (1.98)** (1.45) (0.66) (1.78)*
Soybeans 0.161 2.433 2.287 2.269 0.356 1.915
(0.31) (1.99)** (1.89)* (1.85)* (1.33) (1.77)*
Wheat 1.016 0.107 1.124 0.004 1.172 1.175
(1.90)* (0.04) (1.94)* (0.05) (1.83)* (1.71)*
World sugar 1.140 0.617 1.757 1.542 0.120 1.663
(1.79)* (0.36) (1.88)* (1.81)* (0.05) (1.84)*
Commodity
Cocoa 5.107 1.890 6.980 2.372 5.370 10.702
(2.87)*** (1.98)** (3.19)*** (2.12)** (3.41)*** (3.97)***
Coffee 0.085 2.815 2.636 3.092 0.997 4.088
(0.03) (0.91) (0.46) (1.41) (0.13) (0.80)
Crude oil 1.361 1.281 2.641 2.182 0.795 2.975
(1.89)* (1.03) (2.29)** (0.98) (0.54) (1.66)*
Heating oil 1.244 1.110 0.135 1.008 0.912 0.041
(0.55) (0.38) (0.09) (0.31) (0.48) (0.10)
Foreign Currency
British pound 0.234 0.133 0.367 0.147 0.166 0.313
(0.50) (0.31) (1.19) (0.93) (0.30) (0.64)
Deutsche mark 1.361 0.161 1.503 0.234 0.987 1.211
(1.88)* (0.48) (1.99)** (0.51) (1.40) (1.81)*
Japanese yen 1.773 1.111 2.883 0.718 1.406 2.124
(1.72)* (2.24)** (2.75)*** (1.21) (1.94)* (2.19)**
Swiss franc 0.327 1.338 1.012 0.955 0.214 1.169
(0.18) (1.90)* (0.98) (1.60) (0.33) (1.73)*
Note. The return is measured as the abnormal return based on Equation (5), in percent. A (B) denotes the group with large
increase (decrease) in net positions of a trader type. A large change is deﬁned as one standard deviation away from the
mean positions. Test statistics for individual coefﬁcients reported in parentheses are t-statistics computed using White (1980)
heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors. ***, **, and * denote signiﬁcance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively.
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hedgers except for the cocoa and coffee futures. Note that the mean
returns for A, B, and AMB are insignificant for financial futures, and
smaller in magnitude than for the other markets, suggesting that the
hedging pressure effect is less likely to prevail in ﬁnancial futures mar-
kets (e.g., Bessembinder, 1992).
The mean abnormal return for AMB for hedgers roughly captures
the hedging pressure effect, whereas that for speculators represents risk
premiums earned and/or superior timing ability possessed by these
traders. To gain a sense of possible superior timing ability of speculators,
it is useful to compare the magnitude of mean return for AMB for spec-
ulators and hedgers. A larger return for AMB for speculators relative to
that for hedgers is indicative of superior timing ability possessed by spec-
ulators. For eight futures markets that show a signiﬁcant return for AMB
(excluding the cocoa futures that has an unexpected sign), the mean
return for AMB for speculators is larger in magnitude than that for
hedgers in ﬁve markets, that is, the corn, soybean, sugar, Deutsche mark,
and Japanese yen futures. However, our further tests (not reported) indi-
cate that the magnitude of mean return for AMB for speculators is not
significantly different from that for hedgers except for the Deutsche
mark and Japanese yen futures. Therefore, it does not appear that spec-
ulators possess superior timing ability with a few exceptions, but they
generally outperform hedgers. Consistent with the findings in Wang
(2001), our results suggest that the superior performance of speculators
primarily results from hedging pressure effects. Several extant studies
also examine the performance of major types of futures traders, but the
evidence is inconclusive. For example, Chang (1985) and Leuthold et al.
(1994) show that speculators are better informed. In contrast,
Hartzmark (1987, 1991) ﬁnds that hedgers make money, but speculators
do not.
We also examine the proﬁtability of a strategy that follows a large/
small net position by type of trader. Net positions by type of trader are
sorted into large and small position groups. A large (small) position
is deﬁned as the net position in the top (bottom) 25% of ranked posi-
tions. We compute the mean abnormal return for large position group,
small position group, and large–small position group. Although not
reported, the results are broadly consistent with the ﬁndings in Table V.
Moreover, the mean returns for trading strategies seem to be more
signiﬁcant than those in Table V. These more signiﬁcant results are likely
due to the fact that the trading rule based on extreme positions assigns
inappropriate weights to a few outliers.
Further Tests
Table II shows that speculators are contrarians, while hedgers exhibit
positive feedback trading behavior. Moreover, Tables III–V show that the
trades of speculators are more likely to be in the same direction as mar-
ket movements than those of hedgers. Therefore, it is of interest to
examine whether monthly future returns exhibit mean reversion, which
likely makes negative feedback trades of speculators proﬁtable. To test
this conjecture, we regress abnormal returns in the current month on
those in the previous month, i.e.,
(6)
A negative k in Equation (6) implies that futures prices are mean
reverting over the monthly interval. Table VI reports the results of esti-
mating Equation (6). The results indicate that the coefﬁcient estimate
for lag returns is negative for the S&P 500 index, agricultural, and com-
modity futures, and positive for the other markets. However, none of the
coefficient estimates is significant. Therefore, it does not appear that
mean reversion offers an explanation for the superior performance of
speculators in these futures markets.
INTRA-PERIOD TRADING BEHAVIOR
BY TYPE OF TRADER
Futures prices are more volatile compared to equity prices, and futures
traders except those hedging long-term commitments typically hold posi-
tions for shorter horizons. Therefore, it may be interesting to look at
intra-period trading behavior by type of trader. We examine intra-period
trading behavior by focusing on the contemporaneous relation between
changes in net positions by type of trader and returns during the same
month after controlling for lag information variables, i.e.,
(7)
where Rt is the return in month t, and i denotes speculators and hedgers.
The results of estimating Equation (7) are reported in Table VII. To
conserve space, only the coefficients for changes in net positions are
reported. Surprisingly, the results show that the slope coefﬁcient estimate
for changes in net positions is signiﬁcantly positive (negative) for specula-
tors (hedgers) in all these markets, and the adjusted R2s of regressions are
Rt  g
i
0  g
i
1¢NIit  ©gi2j£jt1  hit
rt  k0  krt1  mt
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TABLE VI
The Relation Between Current Returns and Returns
in the Previous Month
Intercept rt1 Durbin-Waston Adjusted R
2
Financial
S&P 500 0.036 0.044 1.98 0.017
(1.38) (0.39)
T-bill 0.013 0.065 1.96 0.004
(0.46) (0.68)
T-bond 0.014 0.010 1.99 0.008
(0.13) (0.91)
Agricultural
Corn 0.002 0.125 2.01 0.010
(0.02) (1.09)
Soybeans 0.019 0.066 2.01 0.008
(0.03) (0.78)
Wheat 0.077 0.056 1.98 0.003
(0.31) (0.53)
World sugar 0.027 0.013 1.99 0.004
(0.03) (0.11)
Commodity
Cocoa 0.027 0.112 2.05 0.048
(0.42) (1.21)
Coffee 0.066 0.045 2.00 0.002
(0.51) (0.32)
Crude oil 0.189 0.054 1.93 0.008
(0.23) (0.34)
Heating oil 0.038 0.051 2.00 0.009
(0.46) (0.37)
Foreign Currency
British pound 0.056 0.194 2.05 0.035
(0.26) (1.19)
Deutsche mark 0.336 0.045 1.94 0.001
(1.23) (0.48)
Japanese yen 0.127 0.114 1.99 0.011
(0.34) (0.91)
Swiss franc 0.264 0.039 2.00 0.008
(0.82) (0.40)
Note. This table reports the regression results of current month’s abnormal returns on the previous month’s
abnormal returns [Equation (6)]. Test statistics for individual coefﬁcients reported in parentheses are t-statistics
computed using White (1980) heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors. ***, **, and * denote signiﬁcance at
the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively.
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TABLE VII
Changes in Net Positions by Type of Trader and Returns in the Same Month
Speculator Hedger
Coefﬁcient Adj. R2 Coefﬁcient Adj. R2
Financial
S&P 500 0.177 0.171 0.160 0.263
(4.41)*** (5.53)***
T-bill 0.043 0.135 0.033 0.136
(4.30)*** (4.84)***
T-bond 0.054 0.246 0.041 0.252
(6.34)*** (6.45)***
Agricultural
Corn 0.126 0.288 0.116 0.295
(5.39)*** (5.98)***
Soybeans 0.316 0.578 0.281 0.628
(9.01)*** (10.24)***
Wheat 0.380 0.315 0.322 0.342
(7.31)*** (7.65)***
World sugar 0.207 0.294 0.168 0.337
(7.29)*** (7.28)***
Commodity
Cocoa 0.578 0.415 0.481 0.403
(7.91)*** (7.87)***
Coffee 1.094 0.293 1.088 0.336
(8.06)*** (8.63)***
Crude oil 0.220 0.397 0.154 0.381
(10.49)*** (10.03)***
Heating oil 0.564 0.425 0.404 0.449
(8.41)*** (9.61)***
Foreign Currency
British pound 0.085 0.467 0.066 0.556
(9.73)*** (9.47)***
Deutsche mark 0.070 0.436 0.051 0.471
(7.95)*** (8.10)***
Japanese yen 0.119 0.276 0.083 0.391
(7.34)*** (9.73)***
Swiss franc 0.122 0.366 0.088 0.548
(8.32)*** (9.45)***
Note. This table reports the results of estimating Equation (7). To conserve space, only the coefﬁcients asso-
ciated with changes in net positions and the R2s of regressions are reported. Test statistics for individual coefﬁ-
cients reported in parentheses are t-statistics computed using White (1980) heteroskedasticity consistent
standard errors. ***, **, and * denote signiﬁcance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively.
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reasonably large. This result is consistent with the signs of contemporane-
ous correlations for the two types of traders reported in Table I.
Given the extant evidence, hedgers do not appear to adjust their posi-
tions frequently in the short run. This is not difficult to understand
because hedgers are typically concerned about the value of median- or
long-term risk exposures. Therefore, the results in Table VII are likely to
result from speculator herding and the possible impact of herding.
Herding means that a group of investors trade in the same direction over a
period of time. Several extant studies document evidence that some insti-
tutional investors (mutual funds, pension funds) herd, and their herding
impacts stock prices (e.g., Grinblatt et al., 1995; Lakonishok et al., 1992).
Managed futures funds and commodity pools are the major types of spec-
ulators in futures markets.11 Several studies show that managed futures
trading is purported to be guided by similar feedback trading systems (e.g.,
Brorsen & Irwin, 1987; Elton et al., 1987; Irwin & Yoshimaru, 1999).
Therefore, speculators tend to herd, and their herding moves prices over a
short time interval, which induces the negative relation between changes
in hedger positions and returns in the same month.
CONCLUSIONS
This article examines some determinants of trading decisions and the
performance of the two major types of futures traders—speculators and
hedgers—in 15 futures markets. The evidence indicates that, after
accounting for market risk factors, speculators have a tendency to follow
market sentiment, and increase (decrease) net futures positions when
the market has risen (fallen). By contrast, hedgers trade against market
sentiment, and engage in positive feedback trading. The positive feed-
back trading of hedgers is not inconsistent with certain dynamic hedging
strategies, and the contrarian behavior of speculators is likely to be
induced by the trades of hedgers.
We also find that speculators generally outperform hedgers. A
trading strategy following large changes in speculator positions and/or
contrary to large changes in hedger positions is signiﬁcantly proﬁtable in
most agricultural, commodity, and currency futures markets. However,
the superior performance seems to result from hedging pressure effects
rather than superior timing ability possessed by speculators. The preva-
lence of hedging pressure effects in U.S. futures markets is consistent
11Managed futures refer to futures funds and pools that combine investors’ money to speculate in
futures and forward contracts on commodities and ﬁnancial instruments by either institutions or
investment advisors.
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with the literature (e.g., Bessembinder, 1992; De Roon et al., 2000).
Analyses of intramonth trading behavior, however, reveal that specula-
tors buy (sell) when the returns in the same month are higher (lower),
whereas the opposite is true for hedgers. This suggests that speculators
tend to herd, and their herding likely impacts futures prices.
A simultaneous analysis of the behavior and performance by type of
trader allows us to infer whether trades of a trader type destabilize the
market. This issue has been of great interest to academics and ﬁnancial
regulators. The contrarian behavior of speculators together with their
positive performance does not appear to be consistent with the common
view of destabilizing speculation (e.g., Hart & Kreps, 1986; Stein, 1987).
However, the evidence of the positive feedback trading of hedgers
together with their negative performance suggests that hedgers have a
destabilizing influence over an intermediate (monthly) horizon. These
ﬁndings have implications for academics attempting to understand the
impact of trades by traders, and for futures market regulators concerned
with market stability.
APPENDIX
Exchange Information, Delivery Months, and Reporting Level 
(as of the End of 1999) for All Futures Contracts
Reporting Level
Future Contract Exchange Delivery Months (Contracts)
Financial
S&P 500 Chicago Mercantile Exchange 3,6,9,12 600
T-bill (90 days) Chicago Mercantile Exchange 3,6,9,12 150
T-bond (15–30 years) Chicago Board of Trade 3,6,9,12 500
Agricultural
Corn Chicago Board of Trade 3,5,7,9,12 750,000 (bushels)
Soybeans Chicago Board of Trade 1,3,5,7,8,9,11 500,000 (bushels)
Wheat Chicago Board of Trade 3,5,7,9,12 500,000 (bushels)
World sugar Coffee, Sugar and Cocoa Exchange 3,5,7,9,12 300
Commodity
Cocoa Coffee, Sugar and Cocoa Exchange 3,5,7,9,12 100
Coffee Coffee, Sugar and Cocoa Exchange 3,5,7,9,12 50
Crude oil New York Mercantile Exchange All 300
Heating oil New York Mercantile Exchange All 250
Foreign Currency
British pound Chicago Mercantile Exchange 3,6,9,12 200
Deutsche mark Chicago Mercantile Exchange 3,6,9,12 200
Japanese yen Chicago Mercantile Exchange 3,6,9,12 200
Swiss franc Chicago Mercantile Exchange 3,6,9,12 200
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